A prominent liberal explanation for why states join international organizations is to advance norms that such organizations represent. We examine the patterns of membership on the nowdefunct United Nations Human Rights Commission (now the UN Human Rights Council). In regions where democratic norms did not hold sway, members were elected to degrade human rights norms. Illiberal states sought seats in order to shield themselves or neighbors from censure by the Commission. As regions became more democratic, it became harder for states with poor records to be elected and easier for states with better human rights records to be elected.
Introduction
Following the creation of the new United Nations Human Rights Council in March 2006, attention is again focused on the UN as a defender of international human rights. International cooperation on human rights differs in important ways from international cooperation on other issues. Rather than creating rules to govern interactions between states, in the arena of human rights, states attempt to create codes of conduct for how states should behave vis-à-vis their own citizens. In addition to directly challenging state sovereignty by codifying rules of behavior, international cooperation on human rights carries little material benefit. As a result, international human rights organizations are weaker than their economic counterparts. Examining the challenges that confront human rights organizations raises broader questions about the nature of state interest in human rights and the international organizations that promote those rights. Is that interest sincere or strategic? What motivates states to seek membership in international human rights organizations like the Human Rights Council's predecessor organization, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR)?
Previous research has examined which governments are targeted for sanction by the UNCHR (Lebovic and Voeten 2006a) , but these decisions are likely to be shaped by the preferences and motivations of the states already elected to that body. Did states initially pursue membership on the Commission in order to strengthen norms of human rights internationally? Or did they seek to avoid accusations concerning their own behavior? Further complicating this membership selection issue is the fact that seats on the Commission were chosen by regional slates. Regional groupings of states may have varied in their criteria for selecting representatives, which would affect the nature of the decisions made by the Commission.
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between a state's human rights practices and membership on the UNCHR, an organization that embodied the "procedural core of the human rights regime" (Donnelly 1989, 208) . We find that states with particularly good and particularly poor records were elected to the Commission to either promote or inhibit its work, respectively.
The regional nature of the selection process, however, plays an important modifying role. In more democratic regions, the states with comparatively poorer human rights records were less likely to be selected for the Commission. Rather, states with better than average records were more likely to be selected. The strengthening of liberal norms consequent with the post-Cold War spread of democracy altered the Commission's composition. Our work thus supports the claims of scholars that find important links between democracy and the effects of human rights treaties (Neumayer 2005) as well as those who focus on the regional effects of democratization on human rights (Lutz and Sikkink 2000) .
More broadly, we argue that scholars and practitioners who are concerned about the effectiveness of international organizations need to address the importance of membership criteria. The absence of membership criteria for the UNCHR had clear implications for its effectiveness, as states with poor human rights records were able to be members and shape its workload accordingly. Furthermore, the failure of the United Nations to adopt membership criteria for the new Human Rights Council suggests that the CHR's successor organization will encounter many of the same difficulties the Commission did, despite important differences between the two. Overall, our findings suggest that scholars of international organizations need to move beyond merely judging effectiveness in terms of compliance by developing a clearer understanding of state incentives to seek election to international organizations in the first place.
History of the UNCHR
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights was created in 1946 as a component of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Its original purpose was to draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In order to devote the effort necessary to negotiate the Universal Declaration, the UNCHR initially denied itself the authority to investigate alleged human rights violations committed by UN member countries. Decolonization produced an increase in the size of the Commission as more developing countries were eligible for membership. These new members, in turn, expanded the Commission's activities. Issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, colonialism, and apartheid served to invigorate the Commission. ECOSOC Resolutions 1235 (1967 ) and 1503 (1970 authorized the Commission to investigate countries' human rights practices. Under Resolution 1235, the Commission was empowered to publicly shame a state by noting concern about a situation. Consideration of a resolution under the 1235 procedure entailed a public debate, and a successful resolution meant appointing a rapporteur to investigate the situation and report back to the Commission.
1 Unlike 1 Skeptics frequently questioned the relevance of the UNCHR, pointing to its widely publicized failure to stop egregious abuses of human rights such as the genocides of Rwanda and Sudan. But the apparent absence of enforcement by the UNCHR may have understated the impact of the Commission on states' human rights practices.
States actively seek to avoid scrutiny by the Commission (Alston 1992 , 173, Tolley 1987 and they strive to control the message that the Commission sent about human rights practices in their countries (Guest 1990; Kent 1995) . Governments try to avoid the stigma of being delegitimized by the Commission, since international signals have repercussions for a state's domestic legitimacy (Lutz and Sikkink 2000, 659) . States also make extensive efforts to rebut or discredit international criticism of their human rights practices (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999, 23 In any given year, one-third of the seats on the Commission were up for election, and elections took place according to a two-step procedure.
First, the regional groupings attempted to agree on representatives, who were then subject to a confirmation vote by ECOSOC. If the states in a region failed to agree on a regional state, then regional representatives for the Commission were elected via secret ballot by ECOSOC.
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In the recent past, the Commission became a magnet for criticism as states with questionable human rights records gained seats. In 2003, the US Department of State accused 19 Commission point to monitor and shape the behavior of signatories (Joachim 2003; Thomas 2001; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005) . They could also use the message sent by UNCHR to build a coalition for action in other states. Jetschke (1999, 145) notes that non-governmental organizations played an important role in lobbying the UNCHR for action on Indonesia. On the basis of the attention brought by the Commission to the situation in East Timor, it became easier for these same organizations to lobby politicians in the US Congress to pressure Indonesia. From a constructivist perspective, an additional asset from joining international organizations is participating in the debate that frames international norms. The dialogue that occurs within an international organization helps to define what the rules and norms of acceptable behavior are and establishes a normative context which influences and constrains the behavior of decision makers (Finnemore 1993) . Discussion in the UNCHR and its successor, the UNHRC, shape what the international rules and standards should be, and, most importantly, help to define which offenses are punishable (Lebovic and Voeten 2006a) . These norms also create a social pressure for states to behave appropriately based on these common norms (Risse and Sikkink 1999) . Lebovic and Voeten (2006a) assert that shaming is possible because states share a sense of membership in an international community.
Passing resolutions under the auspices of the UNCHR provided several benefits to states.
First, these resolutions signaled that rights abuses had occurred which may have warranted punishment. Public votes provided information about a government's behavior and could influence perceptions about that government's reputation. The UNCHR also helped states coordinate their actions by determining which acts by which states were worthy of punishment.
This coordination function improved the efficacy of the institution.
UNCHR membership also offered expressive benefits; member states were able to use the institution as a platform for statements to promote international norms of behavior and to comment on the appropriateness of current state behavior (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse 2000) . Joining a human rights organization or signing human rights treaties is a visible method of demonstrating a commitment to appropriate conduct (Hathaway 2002; Heynes and Viljoen 2001, 490) . Such actions are reputation-enhancing for states attempting to portray themselves as liberalizing, particularly if they are looking for further future cooperation with democratic states.
Additionally, states may have sought a position on the Commission in order to strengthen existing international norms.
Normative explanations for the democratic peace are also relevant here, as states tend to externalize norms that characterize their domestic political environment. Rules and norms of international behavior are extensions of domestic behavior (Maoz and Russett 1993) . As evidence, Mitchell, Gates, and Hegre (1999) find that as the percentage of democracies in the international system increases, the likelihood of conflict decreases. Additionally, Mitchell (2002) finds that as the proportion of democracies in the international system increases, the more likely all states adhere to norms of non-violent conflict resolution and use of conflict mediation.
Respect for human rights is another important norm that characterizes democratic domestic politics. Empirical studies on the link between democracy and good human rights practices are numerous (Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1999; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999) . Democracies sign human rights treaties to promote strong reliance on the rule of law (Gaubatz 1996; Slaughter 2000) , and democratic states should be more likely to seek membership in human rights institutions because of their respect for and reliance on international law for dispute resolution (Dixon 1994; Russett and Oneal 2001) .
If democracies see the UNCHR as an opportunity to advance liberal norms such as respect for human rights, then they have strong motivation for seeking membership on the UNCHR.
Historically, democratic states have served as norm entrepreneurs, striving to socialize other states on the importance of human rights (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) and to create institutions to formalize commitments to norms of liberal behavior. 7 We should see evidence of continued support for liberal norms with more democratic states being represented on the Commission.
New democracies, in particular, might have an incentive to join international human rights organizations as this commitment may enable them to bolster a domestic commitment to the principles of human rights. Joining strong international institutions provides politicians in new democracies with the means to reduce future uncertainty, as their commitments bind future politicia ns (Moravcsik 2000) .
Hypothesis 1: Democracies will be more likely to be elected to the UNCHR.
The factors that determine states' decisions to seek membership on the UNCHR are not limited to domestic political factors; the realist idea that powerful states should be wellrepresented on the Commission should also be considered. Participation on the UNCHR would allow major powers to reward their allies and punish their adversaries. Throughout the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union proposed resolutions in the UNCHR calling for investigation into each other's human rights practices (Tolley 1987, 115) , making the There is little evidence to support the idea that signing human rights treaties is sufficient to prevent widespread rights abuses. In fact, many of the governments that sign and ratify human rights treaties regularly violate them (Hathaway 2002 Such states may have also sought election to the Commission as an act of self-defense, enabling them to insulate themselves from investigation. Lebovic and Voeten (2006a) find that states on the Commission were less likely to be targets of investigations, and they were also less inclined to support investigating other members of the Commission. Lobbying by UNCHR members under investigation led other members to vote down sanctioning resolutions (Kent 1995, 13; Dennis 1999, 252) . Thus, it is not surprising that China, which has been a member of the Commission since 1982, was never censured for the Tiananmen Square massacre. 
What external factors shape d membership of the UNCHR?
The previous section examined the incentives that individual states might have had for seeking membership on the UNCHR. These individual motivations, however, may have been moderated by the Commission's membership selection process. Rather than being selected by the membership of ECOSOC as a whole, members of the Commission were elected by region. 9 If the membership selection by all regions merely reflects the individual incentives for membership, then this mechanism should have no discernable affect on shaping the Commission.
Another alternative might be that all regions have the same selection criteria for membership.
There is little in the literature to inform our expectations in this area, so our initial hypothesis is a benign one.
Regional Hypothesis 1: There will be no regional effects on Commission membership.
Looking at human rights practices, however, there is a great deal of variation by region. The physical integrity scores developed by Cingranelli and Richards (1999) should also pursue this goal and select members with above average human rights records.
Eastern and Western Europe have strong human rights records, so we anticipate that representatives from those regions had human rights records exceeding the regional average.
Conversely, if individual states with weak human rights records have an incentive to degrade
human rights norms, regions with weak records may have had an incentive to selected members with below average human rights records.
Regional Hypothesis 2: Regional membership selections will reflect regional preferences.
To be a bit more specific, we consider what might define regional preferences. Mitchell, Kadera, and Crescenzi (2005) suggest that a "strong democratic community" provides fertile ground for the expansion of democratic norms. Typically, this type of community argument has been applied to the system-level (Crescenzi and Enterline 1999; Kadera, Crescenzi and Shannon 2003 ), but we are interested in behavior that does not take place at the system-level. Since election to the Commission was undertaken on a regional basis, we do not believe that we are stretching the premise of this community idea too far by exploring the possibility of a regional democratic community effect.
In Bull's (1977) assessment of the international community, he notes that states form a society based on certain "common rules and institutions" based on common values and interests.
Mitchell, Kadera, and Crescenzi (2005) consider the importance of liberal norms in international affairs as the number of democracies increases worldwide. Because states have a tendency to externalize their domestic norms (Dixon 1994) , as the number (or percentage) of democracies increases, the number of states making decisions on the basis of democratic norms increases. We believe this idea is applicable by region. As the percentage of democracies in a region increases, the importance of democratic norms like respect for human rights increases. On the other hand, in regions with a larger percentage of autocracies, the importance of democratic norms will be slight. In these regions, autocratic norms like coercion and repression will dominate. For this reason, we believe that regions dominated by democracies will select members that will strengthen the democratic norm of respect for human rights. In regions that are dominated by autocracies, representatives will be selected who will either degrade the norm of human rights or manipulate the Commission's work in favor of autocratic norms of behavior.
Because human rights protection is considered a liberal norm, regions with a greater percentage of liberal states are more likely to select representatives to the UNCHR with strong human rights records. Choosing states above the regional mean demonstrate a strong commitment to this liberal norm. Having states with the best human rights records signals to the rest of the world a regional desire not only to maintain the norm, but also a desire to continue to strengthen it. Even if such states have human rights records surpassing those of their neighbors, other liberal states from these regions have less reason to fear possible investigation by the Commission. As supporters of liberal human rights norms, they have an incentive to select the states that will best represent and further those liberal norms. In contrast, in regions where illiberal norms prevail (that is, where there is a low concentration of democracies) states will be less willing to allow states with human rights records that are better than the regional average to represent them, as these might constitute a threat. States are loath to appoint neighboring states that could support investigating them. Selecting states with records lower than the regional average helps ensure that human rights violations in other regional states will not be investigated.
In addition, states with weak human rights records are less likely to be vigorous supporters of extending the definition and international perception of what constitutes violations of human rights norms. The percentage of liberal states in a region defines the strength and direction of regional preferences.
Regional Hypothesis 2a: As the percentage of democratic states in a region increases, the human rights records of that region's representatives will improve.

Research Design
We We measure regime type (Hypothesis 1) by including each state's Polity score (democracyautocracy, ranging from -10 to +10), where high scores ind icate more democratic countries (Jaggers and Gurr 1995) . 11 We test realist explanations for UNCHR membership as a tool of the major powers (Hypothesis 2) by measuring alliance similarity with the regional leader, using
Signorino and Ritter's (1999) S score. 12 Those states with alliances similar to the most powerful state in the region have S scores approaching one, while those with dissimilar alliances have scores closer to zero.
We measure state human rights records (Hypotheses 3 and 4) through the use of physical integrity scores which are taken from Richards (1999, 2004) and are a composite of four variables: extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, and political imprisonment.
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Using reports from both the US State Department and Amnesty International, each state is ranked from zero to two on each of these four activities. A score of zero indicates an incidence of fifty or more violations, one indicates less than fifty violations, and two indicates zero violations. These four scores are then summed to generate a composite score from zero to eight, so that greater values indicate a better human rights record.
14 11 Data on capabilities, alliance similarity, and polity scores were all generated following Bennett and Stam 2000. 12 Alliance data is taken from Gibler and Sarkees 2002. 13 Cingranelli and Richards (1999, 408) define extrajudicial killings are defined as "killings by government officials without due process;" disappearances are defined as "unresolved cases in which political motivations are likely;" torture is defined as the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, by government officials or by private individuals at the instigation of government officials." Imprisonment refers to the "incarceration of people by government officials because of their ideas." 14 Other cross-national studies of human rights (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999) use the Political Terror Scale (PTS) as a measure of national human rights records (Gibney and Dalton 1996) . The PTS is also based
We also include a series of control variables. First, we include state power, measured as each state's regional share of system capabilities, drawn from the Correlates of War project (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972 
Model Specification
Since we argue that incentives differ by region, the appropriate empirical approach requires accounting for regional differences in the characteristics hypothesized to be relevant to UNCHR membership. Accordingly, rather than using the raw physical integrity scores, we measure the deviation from the regional mean for each state in the region. To test the regional hypotheses, on data from the US State Department and Amnesty International reports. However, there are two key differences in the coding scheme. Whereas Cingranelli and Richards' measure disaggregates a state's human rights situation into discrete categories, the PTS is a more holistic classification scheme in which all of the elements (torture, imprisonment, political murder, and disappearances) are weighted equally. In addition, the PTS classifies countries according to the extensiveness of violations rather than an explicit count of the number o f incidents. In other words, torture is "rare" (a score of 1) or "a common part of life" (a score of 4). More information on the PTS can be obtained at (http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/faculty-staff/gibney.html). We reestimated the models in Table II using the PTS scores and obtained the same statistical results (all of the variables significant in Table II retained their significance; all of the insignificant variables re mained so).
particularly regional hypothesis 2a, we interact the proportion of democracies (states with Polity scores greater than 6) in each region with a state's (region-centered) physical integrity score.
Regional hypothesis 2a predicts a positive coefficient on the interaction term; as a region becomes more democratic, states with better human rights records should represent that region on the Commission.
Testing the regional effects of selection might lead one to argue that different models should be estimated for each region. Doing so offers some advantages but imposes an important limitation of only allowing one to compare each region to itself. That is, one might reasonably expect Eastern Europe to elect countries with better human rights records as the region democratized during this period, but for other regions where democratization is less marked between 1980 and 2000, testing the regional hypotheses is more problematic. Accordingly, we pool the regions to permit more robust comparisons. In so doing, we allow the intercept to vary for each of the regions and use the region-centered human rights measure, as well as a measure of the proportion of democracies in the region.
One additional caveat is in order. Not all regional groups at the UN operate in the same manner. Africa tends to choose members for UN bodies by rotating its representatives rather than using competitive elections (Smith 2006 :65, Narasimhan 1988 . A brief review of patterns in the data supports the claim that Africa's selection process is different. If a region selected members by rotation, then we would expect that membership terms would be shorter, ensuring that all states in the region can serve. The mean number of terms on the Commission is significantly lower for Africa (2.26 terms per member) than for other regions, in which members serve 3 or more terms. More African states are serving on the Commission for shorter terms, as only 29% of states in the region serve more than two terms. Given that observers of the UN indicate that Africa fills seats by rotation, and because this finding is supported by our data, we have chosen to exclude Africa from our analysis. Adding Africa to the analysis introduces a region with a selection process that operates differently from the processes at work in other regions, and one where democratic norms do not shape the outcome.
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To account for the time-series cross-sectional nature of the data, we estimate a populationaveraged logit. While conditional models "are more useful when the primary question of interest is the effect of changes in covariates within a particular observation, [marginal models] are more valuable for making comparisons across groups or subpopulations" (Zorn 2001, 475) . Using a marginal, or population-averaged, model avoids estimating cluster-specific effects (the approach a fixed-effects model would take) or assuming that the cluster-specific effect follows a stochastic distribution. Rather, a population-averaged model accounts for non-independence across observations or time (Zorn 2001) . The coefficients in a population-averaged model represent "the average effect, across the entire population, of a one-unit shift in X it on Pr(Y it )" (Zorn 2001:474-5 ). This approach is desirable for our study because we are interested in understanding effects across subpopulations (here, the selection of individual states to the Commission are assumed to be correlated).
Results
The results of our pooled estimation appear in Table I below. Turning to the regional dynamics at play in membership selection for the Human Rights Commission, we find that the coefficient for the interactive term is positive and significant. As the number of democracies in a region increased, states with better human rights records (with higher physical integrity scores) were more likely to become members of the Commission on Human Rights. This comports well with anecdotal impressions of membership on the Commission and specifiesthe mechanism by which different regions approached selecting their representatives to the Commission --the extent to which democratic governance and liberal norms have taken root in a region. It is worth underscoring that this model also already controls for a states' individual Polity score, which gives us greater confidence that we are tapping into regional dynamics and not monadic ones.
Interpreting the interactive relationship between a state's human rights record and the proportion of democracies in the region requires acknowledging the statistical difficulties inherent in interpretation of interaction terms (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2005) . Table II presents predicted probabilities of membership for each of the four regions included in the model in Table I . For each region, predicted probabilities of Commission membership were calculated for the state with the worst human rights record in the region and the state with the best human rights record in the region. To capture the interactive nature of this phenomenon, we also allow the proportion of democracies in each region to vary, from the regional minimum to the regional maximum. While calculation of predicted probabilities in the presence of interactive effects presents no particular problem, appropriate calculation of the confidence intervals about those values does require attentiveness to the interaction term.
The results presented in Table II clarify the interactive relationship between states' human rights records and regional norms. Increasing the percentage of democracies in the region makes it harder for states with poorer records to join the Commission, and comparatively easier for states with good human rights records to join.
Table II in Here
Even in regions with relatively few democracies like Asia, modest increases in the percentage of democracies make it harder for states with bad records to be elected. In Latin America, if the region were at its lowest democratic ebb (5% democracies in the region), states with the worst human rights record would have a predicted probability of Commission membership of 19.90%;
states with a perfect human rights record would have only a 1.17% chance of gaining regional support for membership on the Commission. As the region democratizes, we find that states with the worst human rights records fall to a 5.97% predicted probability of membership on the Commission, while those states with perfect human rights records have a predicted membership probability of 8.33%. This turnabout provides strong support for the hypothesis that, as democratic norms take hold in a region, the dynamic of selection of states to the Commission on Human Rights switches from one that favors states with poor human rights records to one that favors states with strong commitment to the protection of human rights. As shown in Table II , similar dynamics hold for other regions.
Turning to the control variable s in Table I Holding all other variables at their means, we changing a state's share of regional capability from the 10 th percentile to the 90 th percentile increased the probability of membership by 37.28%; changing the count of IGO memberships the same magnitude (10 th to 90 th percentile) increased the probability of membership by 61.17%. These findings demonstrate that both system capability and sovereignty costs matter. Finally, changing a country's status from a non-member of ECOSOC to a member of ECOSOC increased the probability of membership by 27.55%, underscoring the important role of ECOSOC as a parent body to the organization.
In order to test the robustness of our results, we changed the cutoff for a democratic regime to a more demanding standard of a Polity score of eight or greater, and the results are consistent in sign and significance with those presented in Table I . These robustness checks give us added confidence in making a liberal community argument and confidence that the results are not merely an artifice of how we designated what was and what was not a democratic regime. We also reestimated the model in Table I using the Political Terror Scale (PTS) (Gibney and Dalton 1996) . Again, the substantive results are the same as those presented in Table I , suggesting that the results presented here are not sensitive to how human rights violations are measured. Finally, we also tested for the robustness of the results using global measures of capability rather than regional ones. Changing the share of system capabilities from regional to a global level did not alter our main findings. The coefficient on the share of regional capabilities was positive and strongly significant, which comports with the earlier finding: more influential countries are more likely to be elected to the Commission. However, the strength of democracy at a regional level remains an important factor as well.
Further Implications
The results presented above are consistent with an approach that stresses the role that regional dynamics playing in shaping membership on the Commission. Individual democratic states may well have valued membership; indeed, the link between democracy and human rights would suggest this. The decision to choose members, however, was not made by individual states themselves, but by regions. This helps explain the difference between our findings and those of Moravcsik (2000) . In addition, the null finding for alliance similarity can be read as evidence for the influence of regional effects. That non-finding negates the proposition that the United States had virtual veto power over states in other regions and could place its hand-picked choices on the Commission.
Our work builds on a growing literature on the distinctiveness of the democratic community of states. Recent conflict scholarship suggests that the expansion of the zone of democracies has served to strengthen democratic norms (Mitchell 2002) ,. As a result, international organizations that are comprised of democracies have strong effects on reducing the incidence of conflict (Pevehouse and Russett 2006) . In the human rights area, liberal theorists have argued that democracies are different, and that the expansion of the zone of democracies helps us to understand the growing human rights norms cascade (Slaughter 1995; Schmitz and Sikkink 2002:521) . Our theoretical orientation takes its inspiration from these lines of argument, though our focus is on the strength of regional norms on state selections to the UN Commission on Human Rights. We find that the growth of democracies at the regional level has had important effects on the composition of Commission membership. As regions have democratized, states with poor records were less likely to become members, and states with good records were more likely to become members.
In a larger sense, the growing community of democracies brings with it the potential to transform what international organizations do and how we think about them. Since we know that democracies are more likely to provide public goods to their constituents (Brown 1999; Lake and Baum 2001) , and that democratizing states are more likely to join international organizations (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006) , this implies that those international organizations that are increasingly comprised of democratic states might also become more effective at providing goods at the international level. The broader theoretical point is significant, as it implies that it might be possible for international organizations to be both "broad" (by having universal membership) and "deep" (by acting to effectively alter the status quo). More research is surely necessary to link changes in membership with changes in the effectiveness of international organizations.
What implications do these findings hold for the new Human Rights Council? Our findings suggest that the Council may hold considerable promise. Changing the selection mechanism from election by region to election by the General Assembly as a whole not only makes membership more prestigious, it also moves the focus from regional norms created by democratic regimes to system-wide norms. If the global percentage of democracies continues to increase, then states with strong human rights records from any region (regardless of the regional norms) are more likely to be selected to the Human Rights Council. Thus, altering the dynamics of membership selection is likely to strengthen representation by liberal democratic states on the Council. On the other hand, should democracy not continue to spread, then states with weaker human rights records may still collude much like the did at the regional level for the Commission. In the most optimistic case, this does not suggest that the Council will no longer be politicized, but it suggests that the danger of this is considerably smaller than in the Cold War era. For advocates of human rights, the implications of the new selection mechanism are surely encouraging. Chi-squared test for model: 0.0000 Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; ***significant at .1%, two-tailed tests. 
